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Confessions and the Right to Counsel-People
v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361(Cal.1965). The defendant,
a prisoner at San Quentin, was tried, found guilty
of the murder of a fellow prisoner and sentenced
to death. On appeal he claimed that his confession
had been obtained by prison authorities and an
Assistant District Attorney in violation of the
Supreme Court's holding in Escobedo v. Illinois
378 U.S. 478(1964), abstracted at 55 J. Cmmn. L.,
C. & P. S. 493(1964). In a 4-3 decision, the Su-
preme Court of California reversed the conviction
and, in so doing, extended the rule of the Es-
cobedo case beyond the facts there involved. The
confession by Dorado, the court held, was inad-
missible because before it was taken "the authori-
ties had not effectively informed defendant of his
right to counsel or of his absolute right to remain
silent."
In the Escobedo case, the Supreme Court had
held that a confession taken from a suspect in the
police station after the police had refused his
request (and the concurrent request of his lawyer)
that he be allowed to confer with retained counsel
violated defendant's sixth amendment rights.
Because Escobedo had a lawyer who came to the
police station while the interrogation was in
progress the Supreme Court did not have to de-
cide whether a defendant without counsel at that
stage of the proceeding would be entitled to be
told of his right to counsel, or, at the least, given
the advice that counsel would supposedly have
given him-the right to invoke his privilege against
self-incrimination. Dissenting in Escobedo, how-
ever, Justice White had said that "it would be
naive to think that the new constitutional right
announced will depend upon whether the accused
... has asked to consult with counsel in the course
of interrogation."
This prediction of Justice White concerning the
ultimate reach of the Escobedo rationale has
proved accurate, for the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia refused to distinguish between the case where
counsel had already been obtained and the case
where the record simply failed to reflect that the
defendant was aware of his right to counsel. The
importance of Escobedo, the court reasoned, was
not that Escobedo had been denied the right of
counsel by affirmative police conduct, but that
the opinion established that the right to counsel
existed during the interrogation of a "focal" sus-
pect in custody (i.e., an interrogation designed to
elicit an incriminating statement). If the right
existed, the court then said, it could not be waived
unless the record demonstrated that the defendant
knew of its existence: "In the absence of evidence
that defendant already knew that he had a right
to counsel during interrogation, the failure of the
officers to inform him of that right precludes a
finding that he knowingly waived it." And, the
court concluded, a waiver of counsel is not alone
sufficient if the police have not told defendant of
his right to remain silent.
In support of its decision to extend the Escobedo
rule before being compelled to do so by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, the California
court said that its function was not merely to
follow a Supreme Court opinion, but "to enforce
it in situations wherever it logically applied."
Moreover, the court was concerned that if it
waited several years for the Supreme Court to
further define the .Escobedo rule, convictions had in
California in the interim might be subject to re-
versal and the work of law enforcement officers
"would come to naught."
In dissent, three justices concluded that Esco-
bedo was a binding precedent only in a case where
the suspect under interrogation had asked for,
and been denied, an opportunity to consult with
counsel before confessing. The court "should not
extend the rule of the Escobedo case," the dis-
senters argued, but, on the contrary, should
"take a realistic view of the holding in Escobedo
... so as to support law enforcement officers when
their activities are not clearly unlawful, and not to
increase their difficulties in preventing future
murders and other crimes."
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Comment: The opinion of the Supreme Court
of California in the Dorado case represents the
view taken by a minority of state supreme courts
in their construction of the requirements of the
Supreme Court's opinion in the Escobedo case.
Only the Supreme Court of Oregon, in State v.
Neely, 398 P.2d 482(Ore.1965) and the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, in State v. Dufour, 206
A.2d 82(R.I.1965) now follow the Dorado view-
point. The other state courts which have passed
on the question have generally refused to extend
the Escobedo holding beyond its application to the
exact facts of that case and have approved the
admission into evidence of confessions in cases
where the accused was not warned of either his
right to counsel or of his right to remain silent.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patrick, 206 A.2d
295(Pa.1965); People v. Hartgraves, 202 N.E.2d
33(111.1964); Bean v. State, 398 P.2d 251(Nev.
1965); Browne v. State, 131 N.W.2d 169(Wis.
1964); State v. Worley, 132 N.W.2d 764(Neb.
1965).
At least three courts have also passed on the
issue of whether the Escobedo rule (whatever its
ultimate reach) is applicable to cases in which
convictions were had and ordinary appellate
remedies exhausted before the Supreme Court's
decision in that case. In People v. Lopez, 398 P.2d
380(Cal.1965) the Supreme Court of California
concluded that Escobedo should not be applied
retroactively, because that rule was promulgated
not "to undo the procedures of yesterday, which
despite their undesirability did not necessarily
cause the conviction of the innocent," but only to
"discourage oppressive police practices" in the
future. A federal district court also refused to
apply Escobedo retroactively in Hayes v. United
States, 236 F. Supp. 225(E.D. Mo., E.D.1964),
but an opposite result was reached in Fugate v.
Ellenson, 237 F. Supp. 44(Neb.1964).
Search and Seizure-United States v. Ven-
tresca, 85 S. Ct. 741 (1965). After the defendant was
convicted for possessing and operating an illegal
distillery, the Court of Appeals reversed the con-
viction on the ground that an affidavit which had
been filed by an investigator for the Alcohol and
Tobacco Division of the Internal Revenue Service
did not state facts sufficient to show probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant, and that the
search of defendant's home which revealed the
operation of the illicit still was therefore unreason-
able. The Supreme Court of the United States
granted the government's petition for certiorari
and, in a 7-2 decision, reversed the Court of Ap-
peals and upheld the validity of the warrant and
subsequent search.
Although several "investigators" were engaged
in the investigation and surveillance which led to
the application for search warrant, only one swore
to the affidavit which set forth the facts purporting
to show probable cause. In this affidavit he said
that the information which he was presenting to
the court was "based upon personal knowledge
and information which has been obtained from
Investigators of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax
Division, Internal Revenue Service, who have
been assigned to this investigation." The Court
of Appeals held that the affidavit did not make
clear whether the information was, in whole or
in part, the personal knowledge of the affiant or of
the other investigators, and if the latter, whether
it was "hearsay received from unreliable inform-
ants rather than their own personal knowledge."
The Supreme Court, in a strongly worded opin-
ion written by Mr. Justice Goldberg, held that the
reading of the affidavit for search warrant by the
Court of Appeals was "unduly technical and re-
strictive" and that upon examination of the affi-
davit as a whole it was clear that all the observa-
tions referred to were made by "full-time investi-
gators" and that observations "of fellow officers
of the Government engaged in a common investi-
gation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant
applied for by one of their number."
Comment: The Ventresca opinion is a very im-
portant one, but not so much because of the hold-
ing that the facts stated in the affidavit for search
warrant constituted probable cause (they clearly
do), nor for the fact that the case serves as a re-
minder to law enforcement officers to be more
specific in drafting complaints for search warrants
to avoid problems of interpretation of what should
ordinarily be routine phraseology. Rather, the
opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg is important for
the emphasis placed by the Court upon the fact
that in this case the officers applied for and ob-
tained a search warrant instead of searching with-
out warrant, and the Court's obvious concern
that officers who act in this manner should be
encouraged by "commonsense" opinions con-
struing the validity of such warrants. Witness the
following language, directed (it is fair to assume),
not only at lower federal and state courts, but at
prosecutors and police officers:
"Our cases.., strongly [support] the pref-
[Vol. 56
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erence to be accorded searches under a war-
rant, [and indicate] that in a doubtful or
marginal case a search under a warrant may
be sustainable where without one it would
fall." * * * These decisions reflect the recog-
nition that the Fourth Amendment's com-
mands, like all constitutional requirements,
are practical and not abstract. If the teach-
ings of the Court's cases are to be followed
and the constitutional policy served, affi-
davits for search warrants, such as the one
involved here, must be tested and interpreted
by magistrates and courts in a common-
sense and realistic fashion. They are normally
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste
of a criminal investigation. Technical re-
quirements of elaborate specificity once ex-
acted under common law pleadings have no
proper place in this area. A grudging or
negative attitude by reviewing courts toward
warrants will tend to discourage police officers
from submitting their evidence to a judicial
officer before acting. - * * This Court is equally
concerned to uphold the actions of law en-
forcement officers consistently following the
proper constitutional course. This is no
less important to the administration of
justice than the invalidation of convictions
because of disregard of individual rights or of-
ficial overreaching. In our view the officers
in this case did what the Constitution requires.
* * *It is vital that having done so their
actions should be sustained under a system
of justice responsible both to the needs of
individual liberty and the rights of the com-
munity." [Emphasis added.]
Defendant's Right to Waive Jury Trial-Singer
v. United States, 85 S. Ct. 783 (1965). In a unani-
mous opinion, the Supreme Court of the United
States has upheld the validity of Rule 23(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which re-
quires the consent of the court and prosecutor
before allowing a defendant to waive a trial by jury
in a federal criminal case.
The defendant Singer was convicted of mail
fraud. Before trial he sought to waive a jury
"for the purpose of shortening the trial." Although
the court was willing to try the case without a
jury, the prosecutor refused to agree to a bench
trial and the defendant was found guilty after a
jury trial. In seeking to overturn Rule 23(a), the
defendant argued that since he had a constitu-
tional right to a jury trial, he had "a correlative
right to have his case decided by a judge alone if he
consider[ed] such a trial to be to his advantage."
Moreover, the defendant argued, the right to a
jury trial is one which the constitution grants to
a defendant alone and a defendant can waive other
rights granted by the constitution for his benefit
without the consent of the prosecution, e.g., the
privilege against self-incrimination and the pro-
tection against unreasonable search and seizure.
These arguments were rejected by the Court
which found that "A defendant's only constitu-
tional right concerning the method of trial is
to an impartial trial by jury" and "there is no
federally recognized right to a criminal trial before
a judge sitting alone .... " The Court also did not
find the "waiver" argument persuasive. "The
ability to waive a constitutional right," the Court
said, "does not ordinarily carry with it the right
to insist upon the opposite of that right." Since
the Court found that there was no constitutional
right to a trial without a jury, it upheld Rule
23(a) as a reasonable restriction upon the right
to waive because when either the trial court or
the prosecutor refuse to consent to a bench trial
"the result is simply that the defendant is subject
to an impartial trial by jury-the very thing that
the Constitution guarantees him."
Indictment for Robbery-People v. Blanchett,
204 N.E.2d 173(Ill. App.1965). The defendant was
tried for the crime of armed robbery and con-
victed. In his motion in arrest of judgment he
contended that the information failed to comply
with Ch. 38, §111-3(a)(4) Ill. Rev. Stat.(1963)
which requires that a charge allege the commission
of an offense by stating, inter alia, "the time and
place of the offense as definitely as can be done."
The information filed against the defendant
stated only that "at and within the County of
Adams, in the State of Illinois" the defendant,
"on January 15, 1964," committed the crime of
armed robbery.
The Appellate Court for the Fourth District of
Illinois reversed the judgment of conviction on
the ground that the information failed to comply
with the statute, although the court refused to
decide whether the information complied with
the command of the Illinois constitution that
requires informations and indictments to be specific
enough to inform a defendant of the nature of the
accusation, enable him to prepare his defense and
protect him from double jeopardy. The court
19651
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concluded that since the state knew that de-
fendant had been "robbed at his place of residence,
937M/ Maine Street, Quincy, Illinois," that was the
description that should have been given and since
the information did not state the time and place
of the offense "as definitely as could be done" the
information was invalid.
Comments on Defendant's Failure to Testify
People v. Modesto, 398 P. 2d 753 (Cal. 1965). After
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, which held
the privilege against self-incrimination of the fifth
amendment to be binding upon the states, a ques-
tion much mooted was whether those states which
allowed a trial court or prosecutor to comment
upon the failure of the defendant to testify in his
behalf would now have to conform their procedure
to the federal practice which, by virtue of 18 U.S.C.
§3481 and Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60
has long forbidden such comment. In Modesto, the
Supreme Court of California, though reversing a
conviction of murder and sentence of death on
other grounds, held constitutional under the fifth
amendment, as applied to the states through the
fourteenth, the California constitutional provision
allowing limited comment by the court and prose-
cutor upon the defendant's failure to take the
stand in his defense.
The Supreme Court of the United States, said
the California court, has never held that comment
upon the defendant's failure to testify was for-
bidden by the privilege against self-incrimination,
and since the "federal rule is founded not on
constitutional command but on statutory inter-
pretation ... the state must follow only the con-
stitutional and not the statutory aspects of the
privilege." Moreover, since the jury will draw
adverse inferences from a failure of a defendant to
testify "whether or not the court or prosecutor
comments," allowing such comments does not
compel a defendant to testify in violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination. And, the
court noted, in some cases "comments might aid
the defendant by preventing the jury from giving
too much weight to his refusal to take the stand."
Consent to Search-McNear v. RPtay, 398 P.2d
732 (Wash.1965). After the defendant had been
arrested by the police for shoplifting, he signed a
written consent to search his automobile and
apartment for stolen goods. Two detectives from
the larceny detail then executed the consent by
searching the apartment. They found no stolen
property, but during the course of their search they
did find a marijuana cigarette in the drawer of a
night stand. After calling for two officers from the
narcotics detail, the first team of detectives left
the apartment to search defendant's car. The
second team then embarked upon a 2,IJ hour
search of the apartment for additional narcotics
and they eventually found two bags of marijuana.
The next day, while defendant was still in custody,
a narcotics officer confronted him with the mari-
juana and the defendant then signed a statement
admitting that he had possessed narcotics. He
was charged with the unlawful possession of nar-
cotics and subsequently convicted of that charge.
On appeal, defendant contended that the
officers unlawfully searched his apartment beyond
the bounds of the consent, and that since the
seizure of the marijuana was unlawful, it, as well
as his confession which was a "product" of that
seizure, should have been suppressed. Defendant's
first argument was rejected by the court which
held that since the detectives from the larceny
detail were searching in good faith for stolen prop-
erty-as the consent gave them the right to do--
they were not bound to ignore the marijuana
cigarette when it was uncovered during the course
of that search, and that the cigarette was therefore
admissible. The court also held, however, that
the purpose of the second team of officers "was to
find incriminating evidence supportive of the
criminal offense suggested by the discovery of the
marijuana cigarette by the officers of the larceny
detail" and that the "search by the narcotics
detail [did not constitute] in any way, a continuing
search for stolen property." Since such a search
was not within the bounds of the consent given
by defendant, was conducted without warrant,
and not incident to the arrest of defendant, the
court held that it was unlawful. And, said the
court, since "there can be little doubt that the
confrontation induced the admission... [it],
being the 'fruit' of the unlawful search, should
have been excluded" under the doctrine of Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471(1963).
Comment: Readers should note that this
opinion is one of the few decided by state appellate
courts since the Wong Sun decision that accepts
the doctrine that admissions or confessions which
are the "product" of a confrontation of the ac-
cused with the physical fruits of an unlawful
search or seizure must be suppressed under the
fourth amendment without regard to the question
[Vol. 56
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of whether the admissions or confessions were
"voluntary" in the traditional sense.
Obscenity-State v. Locks, 397 P.2d 949(Ariz.
1964). The defendant was convicted of keeping
obscene magazines for sale and he appealed on the
grounds that the statute under which the prosecu-
tion was brought was void for failure to define
the term "obscenity" and that the magazines were
not, as a matter of law, obscene. The Supreme
Court of Arizona sustained both contentions and
reversed the conviction.
Although the state's obscenity statute did not
require that the unlawful possession be "know-
ing," the Supreme Court of Arizona had previously
remedied this constitutional defect (see Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147) in State v. Locks, 372
P.2d 724, by holding that "scienter is implicit
in the statute." The court refused, however, to
supply a definition of obscenity in this case, where
the legislature had not, holding that it was "be-
yond the court's power to supply definitions neces-
sary to render a deficient statute valid, since such
action is legislative and not judicial." Because the
statute did not define the term, the court held
that a potential defendant had no way of deter-
mining what was and what was not obscene in
view of the variety of definitions to be found in
the dictionary and the case law, noting that even
"the trial judge in this case had considerable
difficulty in defining 'obscenity' to the jury."
Since the "citizen cannot be held to answer
charges based upon penal statutes, the mandates
of which are so uncertain that they will admit to
different constructions," the court said, "the
Arizona statute under which the Information in
this case was filed is too indefinite and uncertain
to permit this conviction to stand."
Comment: While the decision of the court also
rests upon its independent finding that the maga-
zines were not obscene as a matter of law, it is
strange that the court refused to supply a defini-
tion of "obscenity" in this case after it had judi-
cially filled an even larger gap in the statute by
holding that scienter was "implicit" in the statute
in the first Locks case. Especially is this true when
it is considered that the Supreme Court of the
United States did not hesitate to judicially define
the term "obscenity" in the federal statute in
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, after the de-
fendant Roth had been convicted, and the case
was on appeal. Future obscenity prosecutions in
Arizona, however, will not be affected inasmuch
as the Arizona legislature has since amended the
statute to supply the needed definition.
Prosecution Entitled to Discovery-State v.
Grove, 398 P.2d 170(Wash.1965). In this case the
defendant was convicted of murder and he ap-
pealed on the ground that the prosecution should
not have been allowed to discover, from his
attorney, a letter which defendant had written,
while in jail, to his wife attempting to exculpate
himself from criminal responsibility for the death
of his wife's mother, the murder victim. The letter
had been given, unsealed, to a jail guard; it was
censored by prison authorities and then forwarded
to the wife. A police investigator later learned of
the letter's existence from a friend of the wife and
secured a search warrant, which he served upon
the defendant's attorney (who was by then in
possession of the letter) in an attempt to obtain the
letter. The attorney refused to surrender the letter
in response to the warrant, but the prosecutor
thereafter obtained an order from the trial court
directing the attorney to produce the letter for
use by the prosecution as evidence.
The Supreme Court of Washington was troubled
by the attempted use of a search warrant to ob-
tain evidence in this fashion, saying that "under
some circumstances the use of a search warrant
respecting the person and the offices of counsel
for a criminal defendant could become highly
debatable to say the least." Since the attorney
refused production under the warrant, however,
the court did not pursue the point.
The defendant contended that the order of pro-
duction was a violation of the privilege of con-
fidential communications between spouses and,
additionally, a violation of the right to counsel
and the privilege against self-incrimination. These
contentions were not upheld by the court. The
privilege against disclosure of husband-wife
communications was not violated, the court said,
because the defendant, knowing that his mail
would be censored, did not intend, and did not
successfully insure, that the communication would
be confidential. Secondly, the court held, the letter
was not a communication between attorney and
client and the lawyer's possession was deemed
to be merely "an effort to withhold evidence that
was incriminating to the defendant."
Comment: Prosecutors ought to note that the
Grove case is one of a growing number of opinions
by state appellate courts (see, e.g., Jones v. Su-
perior Court of Nevada County, 372 P.2d 919(Cal.
19651
